36 REDUCING MARKET DISTORTIONS FOR A MORE PROSPEROUS UKRAINE vertical and horizontal integration facilitates the abuse of market power, reinforces dominance, and increases the risk of anticompetitive behavior. Finally, the lack of clarity regarding the cost-based measure for national and international termination rates may hinder e昀昀orts to regulate markets where operators have signi昀椀cant market power. Mobile telecommunications The lack of pro-competition regulation in the mobile telecommunications subsector appears to be slowing the devel- opment of mobile services in Ukraine. The NKRZI contributes to developing the National Table of Radio Frequencies 63 Allocation, but the 昀椀nal regulatory decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU). Similarly, the NKRZI is authorized to grant licenses for the use of the radio spectrum, but determining the fees for issuing, renewing, extending, or duplicating these licenses is the responsibility of the CMU.64 The NKRZI’s limited independence over spec- trum matters risks reinforcing dominance or restricting entry through the discretionary application of rules. The Law on Radio Frequencies divides the authority for spectrum licensing and spectrum assignment, and it allocates the latter to an SOE, the Ukrainian State Center for Radio Frequencies, which appears to carry out both commercial and regulatory 65 functions. This con昀氀ict of interest may compromise the state’s competitive neutrality by encouraging discrimination between operators and protecting vested interests. The transfer, trading, or leasing of radio-spectrum licenses is not allowed, and the lack of a secondary market constitutes a barrier to entry and expansion, which could reinforce market dominance. The absence of a framework for unlicensed portions of the spectrum also hinders innovation and restricts market access among businesses and industries that rely on those portions of the spectrum, such as those that use technologies associated with the so-called “internet of things.” In addition, there is no framework that takes into account 66 competition considerations for sharing infrastructure or assets (including the radio spectrum), which risks facilitating anticompetitive agreements among market players. Infrastructure-sharing agreements can promote e昀케ciency and foster market competition, as they lower barriers to entry and expansion. A system for assessing how active and passive infrastructure sharing a昀昀ects competition must account for the following factors: (i) the degree of cooperation or auton- omy between the parties to the agreement, which is also a function of the passive or active nature of the infrastructure; (ii) the parties’ market power; (iii) the agreement’s duration; and (iv) the broadness, density, and other characteristics of the infrastructure or assets covered by the agreement. 63 Article 14(2)(3) and (4) of the Radio Frequency Law (Law No. 2244-VIII of December 7, 2017) 64 Article 14(2)(5) of the Radio Frequency Law. 65 Article 16(3)(1) of the Radio Frequency Law. For a description of the activities of the Ukrainian State Center of Radio Frequencies, see http://www.ucrf.gov.ua/en/about-the-centre/main-activity/ 66 A draft law #5051 that is currently reviewed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine proposes rules on radio spectrum sharing. See also the Law “On access to construction, transport and power engineering facilities for the development of telecommuni- cation networks”: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1834-19.