iV REDUCING MARKET DISTORTIONS FOR A MORE PROSPEROUS UKRAINE List of Figures FIGURE 1 Total Factor Productivity Growth, Ukraine, 2002–2016 (%) ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀7 FIGURE 2 Total Factor Productivity Growth, Ukraine and Comparators, 2010–2016 (%) ⸀  ⸀  ⸀7 FIGURE 3 Contributors to GDP Growth (percentage points) ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀7 FIGURE 4 International Trade as a Share of GDP, Ukraine and Comparators, 2006–2017 (%)  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 8 FIGURE 5 Net FDI In昀氀ows as a Share of GDP, Ukraine and Comparators, 2006–2017 (%) ⸀  ⸀  ⸀8 FIGURE 6 Contribution to the Growth of Value Addition by Major Sector, 1991–2015 (percentage points) ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀9 FIGURE 7 Contribution to the Growth of Value addition and Gross Employment, 1991–2016 (percentage points)  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 9 FIGURE 8 Supply-Side GDP Decomposition by Subsector, 2010 and 2015 (%)  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 9 FIGURE 9 The Extent of Market Dominance in Ukraine ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 11 FIGURE 10 Market Structures in the Manufacturing Sector, Ukraine and Comparators  ⸀  ⸀ 12 FIGURE 11 Number of Markets with at Least One SOE, Ukraine and Comparator Countries  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 13 FIGURE 12 Distribution of Ukraine’s 100 Largest SOEs by Sector  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 13 FIGURE 13 Distribution Ukraine’s 100 Largest SOEs by Subsector ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 14 FIGURE 14 Ukrainian SOEs across Sectors by Commercial Viability and Rationale for Government Intervention ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 15 FIGURE 15 Market Shares of Politically Connected Firms by Subsector, 2015 (%)  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 16 FIGURE 16 Multimarket Contacts  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 17 FIGURE 17 Market Concentration in Key Sectors with SOE and Oligarch Participation ⸀  ⸀  ⸀18 FIGURE 18 Does One SOE Hold More Than 50% of the Market?  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 19 FIGURE 19 Does One Politically Connected Firm Hold More Than 50% of the Market? ⸀  ⸀  ⸀19 FIGURE 20 Does One SOE or Politically Connected Firm Hold More than 50% of the Market?  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 19 FIGURE 21 Has a New Producer Entered the Market in the Last Three Years? ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀19 FIGURE 22 New Business Entry Density (average 2006–2016)  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 21 FIGURE 23 New Business Entry Density Gap Among Comparator Economies (2006–2016) ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀  ⸀ 21